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ESSAY

THE JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF OHIO'S
INSANITY DEFENSE
Dr. John K. McHenry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After more than a century of confusion among Ohio courts over
the appropriate standard for the insanity defense, the Ohio Supreme
Court finally settled the issue in State v. Staten.' Curiously, the Staten
test' mirrors the test used by the trial court in Clark v. State3 a case

decided a mere forty years after Ohio became a state and in the same

year that the English courts pronounced the famous M'Naghten's
Case4 decision. A comparison of that well-known English judgment
with the test for insanity contained in the Clark jury charge5 shows the

Ohio position to be an unabashedly superior one, which encompasses

facets of the contemporary Model Penal Code rule' adopted by many
* Practicing Psychologist, Portsmouth, Ohio. B.A., Ohio University (1967); M.A., Ohio
State University (1971); Psy. D., Florida Institute of Technology (1980); J.D., Capital University
(1987).
1. (Staten 1), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969), overruled in part as stated in
State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussed infra note 214). The
Staten test has been reaffirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St. 3d 123, 480 N.E.2d 414 (1985); State v. Brown, 5 Ohio St. 3d 133,
449 N.E.2d 449 (1983); State v. Anders, 29 Ohio St. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d 554 (1972).
2. The Staten test is quoted infra text accompanying note 214.
3. 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (in bank), overruled in part in Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146,
154-55, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) and in part in State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317, 322, 73 N.E. 218,
219 (1904).
4. 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
5. See Clark, 12 Ohio at 494 n.(a) (reprint of jury charge). For an explanation of the
circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the Clark insanity test, see infra notes 91-95 and
accompanying text.
6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). The relevant provision states:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
While the Model Penal Code test has not been adopted in Ohio, the Staten court pointed out
that the two tests had much similarity. Both tests allowed for acquittal by reason of insanity when
mental disease or defect impaired either a defendant's ability to understand "the wrongfulness of
his act" or his ability to "refrain from doing the act"; the major difference was that the Ohio rule
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jurisdictions.' Ironically, Ohio, after enunciating a more enlightened
rule, seemed often to abandon it, as much through desuetude as
8
through judicial reasoning, and to embrace M'Naghten. Thus Ohio,
too, was consigned to the long intellectual struggle and judicial plodding that formed the search for a fair and sensible position on just
what should constitute the defense of insanity.
Beginning with pre-Clark and pre-M'Naghten cases, this article
examines the early strivings of the judiciary in both England and Ohio
to lay the foundation for the development of later pertinent case law.
While at first blush, the comparison of forty years of Ohio statehood
with more than a century of English history might seem a bit selfimportant, the thread of the common law is the focus of examination
and not any particular block of time.
Next, this article examines and compares Clark and M'Naghten
for the messages that they carry. From that point, this paper will
largely occupy itself with the twists and turns that the Ohio courts have
taken on the insanity defense issue, and will also discuss national developments and how some of these developments seeped into Ohio law and
others failed to have any impact.
II.
A.

PRE-CLARK AND PRE-M'NAGHTEN

Five Well-Known English Insanity Cases

The pre-M'Naghten years in England can be described as an era
9
of inquiry and development in the insanity defense area. Of course, for
most of that period, Ohio was not even a state. When the state was
carved from the Northwest Territories in 1803, its nascent judiciary,
lacking case law of its own, sought precedent by copying what it could
from the former colonies and referring back to the bulwark of English
case law.10 Included by the time of Ohio statehood in that body of English law on the insanity defense were the well-known cases of Rex v.8
Arnold11 (1724), Rex v. Ferrers1 2 (1760), and Hadfield's Case'
required that such impairment be complete while the Model Penal Code only required that his
impairment be "substantial." See Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 17-18, 247 N.E.2d at 297; see also
State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 188, 436 N.E.2d 523, 527 (1982) (Staten test is "arguably
less expansive" than Model Penal Code test). See generally Annotation, Modern Test of Status of
Criminal Responsibility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R.4TH 526, 541 (1981).
7. See. e.g., People v. Miller, 33 I11.2d 439, 211 N.E. 2d 708 (1965); Hill v. State, 252 Ind.
601, 250 N.E.2d 429 (1969); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999; see also Annotation, supra note 6, at 536-43.
8. See infra notes 114-216 and accompanying text.
9. See generally I N. WALKER. CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 15-87 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Paine, I Ohio 251 (1824); Key v. Vattier, I Ohio 132 (1823) (in
bank); Lessee of Moore v. Vance, I Ohio 1 (1821).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
It. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (C.P. 1724).
12. 19 How. St. Tr. 885 (H.L. 1760).
13. 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (K.B. 1800).
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(1800); in addition, English courts would later decide Bellingham's
Case" (1812) and Regina v. Oxford' 5 (1840). These cases deserve

some examination" before considering Ohio case law decided prior to
Clark v. State17 and M'Naghten's Case.1 8
1. Rex v. Arnold'9 (1724)
In Arnold, Mr. Justice Tracy of the Common Pleas expounded his

observations of insanity by noting:
[I]t is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a
man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is to be
exempted from punishment: it must be a man that is totally deprived of
his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no
more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never
the object of punishment . . .0
Through this conception of insanity, which came to be called the "Wild
Beast Test," 2' the absence of cognitive, intellectual capacity was the
line of demarkation between the sane and the insane; however, this absence had to be complete.

The strategy of the prosecution in Arnold, therefore, was to show

that the defendant was not totally devoid of reason, despite the consid-

erable evidence of his madness. 2 The prosecution attempted to prove
purpose and design by calling witnesses who testified that, on the day
of the crime, Arnold had bought ammunition, test-fired his gun, and
14. 54 Old Bailey Session Papers 263 (1812) (No. 433) (available in Harvard Law School
Library, Special Collections).
15. 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1840).
16. While these five cases are among those most commonly cited in narrating the preM'Naghten history of the insanity defense in England, their preeminence has been questioned in
light of numerous, often successful insanity defenses of the same era in cases that were reported
only in the Old Bailey Session Papers. See I N. WALKER, supra note 9, at 52-91.
17. 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (in bank), overruled in part in Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146,
154, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) and in part in State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317, 322, 73 N.E. 218, 219
(1904).
18. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
19. 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (C.P. 1724).
20. Id. at 764-65 (Tracy, J.,
jury charge).
21. See generally Platt & Diamond, The Origins and Development of the "Wild Beast"
Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J.HIsT.
BEHAVIORAL Sci. 355 (1965).
22. See Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. at 725, 729, 731-40 (testimony that Arnold believed his
intended victim had bewitched him, was "in his belly," and had prevented him from going fishing
by being "with him"; that he complained he was tempted by the devil and surrounded by "imps";
that he asked his barber to cut his throat; and that he tore up his landlady's rug and stuffed the
pieces in his ears).

Published by eCommons, 1987

52

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13:1

asked two people where his intended victim could be found. Other prosecution witnesses testified that Arnold had attempted to evade capture
after the shooting and later professed remorse when he was in. prison.23
The state's argument carried the day. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty and the judge sentenced Arnold to be hanged. 4 The judicial
acceptance of partial insanity would have to wait.
2. Rex v. Ferrers2" (1760)
In 1760, the House of Lords tried and convicted Lawrence Earl
Ferrers, an English nobleman who had shot and killed his steward."6
The Solicitor General's summation preserved the "Wild Beast Test" by
stating that total permanent lack of reason would be grounds for an
acquittal.27 However, a new twist was added when he acknowledged
that a total but temporary lack of reason could also lead to acquittal.2 8
Partial insanity, which by definition would be intermingled with some
degree of reason, could not.2 9
Lord Ferrers, who by all accounts committed the crime because of
a delusional and pathological hatred of his steward, was nevertheless
convicted, partly as a result of his conducting his own defense. 0 Apparently his self-representation was so competently and carefully performed that it was impossible to believe he was insane.81 Hence, the
defense of insanity failed, not for want of evidence, but for an abundance of skill on the part of the defendant in his alternate role as counselor for the defense. His Lordship was executed. 2
3. Hadfield's Case3 (1800)
In 1800, James Hadfield stood up on his seat at the theatre and
fired a shot at King George III." At Hadfield's trial for treason, his
attorney, Thomas Erskine, raised the defense of insanity and set upon
the task of challenging the accepted test of the day. The "Wild Beast
Test," he said,, was not an appropriate test, since a total deprivation of
23. See id. at 702-54 (testimony).
24. Id. at 766 (Tracy, J., pronouncement of sentence). It is ironic that Arnold's intended
victim showed more compassion than had the jury. Lord Onslow asked the judge for mercy for his
would-be slayer, and the judge thereupon commuted Arnold's sentence to a prison term. Id.
25. 19 How. St. Tr. 885 (H.L. 1760).
26. Id. at 887-88 (Henley, Lord High Steward, reading of indictment).
27. Id. at 947 (Yorke, Solicitor Gen., summation) (discussing existing precedents).
28. Id. (Yorke, Solicitor Gen., summation).
29. Id. (Yorke, Solicitor Gen., summation).
30. See generally id. at 902-45 (testimony).
31. See T. MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS 11 (1985).
32.
33.
34.

Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr. at 973-79 (report of the execution).
27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (K.B. 1800).
See id. at 1284 (Abbott, Counsel for the Crown, reading of indictment).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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reason and memory was found only in mere idiots or those so deranged
that they were hardly conscious of the world around them.35 "In other
cases, reason is not driven from her seat, but distraction sits down upon
it along with her, holds her, trembling, upon it, and frightens her from
her propriety.""
From the nature of Hadfield's madness, Erskine had no choice but
to confront the accepted tests for insanity as laid down by Arnold and
Ferrers: his client did know right from wrong and did appreciate the
illegality and enormity of his attempted murder of the King. In fact, it
was this very knowledge of his act that demonstrated Hadfield's
insanity.
To understand this, one must first note that James Hadfield was a
valorous soldier of the King who had served in the French Revolutionary Wars. It was only after receiving two severe head wounds from
sword blows that his lunacy began. At first he believed himself to be
King George and would search for his crown. He apparently had
seizures so violent that his doctor had him lashed to his bed. Later, his
delusion changed and he believed himself to be God and decided that
mankind was doomed to perish unless he could bring about his own
martyrdom.' 7 Since suicide was a sin, Hadfield hatched a scheme
whereby he would fire a shot in the general direction of the monarch,
but aimed to miss (Hadfield held the king in high estimation, and did
not want to kill him). Such an attempt was punishable by death and,
he reasoned, death would be the result, either at the hands of a frenzied mob or by the executioner. Thereby the world would be saved."
Hadfield's twisted plan failed, not because he was unable or unwilling to perform the act, but because the prosecution was unable to
derail Erskine's successful argument that delusion was and should be a
valid test of insanity. After a parade of twelve witnesses had presented
the woeful tale of James Hadfield, Lord Chief Justice Kenyon of the
King's Bench interrupted, only to be informed that twenty more witnesses were willing to do the same. 39 In his wisdom, Lord Kenyon subsequently advised the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty.' 0 The jury
complied, adding as the reason for the acquittal that Hadfield was
"under the influence of Insanity at the time the act was committed."'
James Hadfield was sent fo an insane asylum and died forty-one years

35. Id. at 1312 (Erskine, defense counsel, opening statement).
36. Id. at 1313 (Erskine, defense counsel, opening statement).
37. Id. at 1332, 1336. 1338, 1347 (testimony).
38. Id. at 1319-21 (Erskine, defense counsel, opening statement).
39. Id. at 1353.
40. Id. at 1355 (Kenyon, L.C.J., jury charge).
41. byId.
at 1356 (jury1987
verdict).
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later in Bedlam."2
It would have been interesting to see the result had the case
against Hadfield gone to the jury without such an instruction. One may
suspect that Hadfield's plan for world salvation would have been carried out: juries then-like juries now-seemed disposed to reject the
insanity plea generally, as well as variations on that theme particularly.43 Speculation that a jury might have returned a guilty verdict in

Hadfield is strengthened by the result in the trial of John Bellingham.
4.

Bellingham's Case" (1812)

John Bellingham operated under the delusion that his failed business ventures in Russia and his five years of imprisonment there for
bad debts were the fault of the English government. Thus, because of
his government's refusal to protest the abuse of an Englishman at the

hands of a foreign government or to provide him with some form of
Bellingham came to believe that assassicompensation for his suffering,
45
remedy.
only
his
was
nation
On May 11, 1812, Bellingham shot and killed the Right Honorable Spencer Perceval. ' OFour days later, the trial of this seemingly sane
man began and ended on the same day. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield
of the Common Pleas commented to the jury that the evidence of Bel-

lingham's mental derangement, "[far from showing him to have been
insane,] ha[d] most distinctly proved . . . that he was in every respect
a full and competent judge of all his actions.' 7 In fact, Bellingham

himself denied being insane and addressed the court coherently and politely about his incredible story." However, the bizarre content of his
tale made no difference and the jury returned the expected guilty verdict.' 9 Three days later, he mounted the gallows.5 0 The defense of in-

42. See T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 16.
43. See generally id. at 109-10.
44. 54 Old Bailey Session Papers [O.B.S.P.] 263 (1812) (No. 433) (available in Harvard
Law School Library, Special Collections). An account of this case is printed in G. COLLINSON. A
TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING

IDIOTS, LUNATICS, AND OTHER PERSONS NON COMPOS

MENTIs 636 add. (London 1812). See generally I N. WALKER, supra note 9, at 272 (noting

likelihood that the two sources were derived from "two independent reports").
45. 54 O.B.S.P. at 267-70 (testimony of defendant); see also G. COLLINSON, supra note 44,
at 649-51 (Gibbs, Att'y Gen., opening statement).
46. 54 O.B.S.P. at 263-64 (testimony); see also G. COLLINSON, supra note 44, at 636. Perceval held the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. See G.
COLLINSON, supra note 44, at 636.
47. 54 O.B.S.P. at 273 (Mansfield, L.C.J., jury charge); see also G. COLLINSON, supra note
44, at 674 (same).
48. 54 O.B.S.P. at 267-70 (testimony of defendant); see also G. COLLINSON, supra note 44,
at 663 (summarizing defendant's testimony).
49. 54 O.B.S.P. at 273 (jury verdict); see also G. COLLINSON, supra note 44, at 674 (same).
50. See T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 19 ("As Bellingham stood cheerfully at the gallows
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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sanity based on delusion did not see the light of day of judicial
51
reason.
5. Regina v. Oxford52 (1840)
In Oxford, the last of the five pre-Clark, pre-M'Naghten founda-

tion cases, the defendant discharged two pistols at Queen Victoria and
then volunteered himself as the culprit when the crowd seized the
wrong man. Evidence admitted into trial clearly showed him to be
mentally deranged. Documents found in Oxford's residence detailed
what appeared at first to be the existence of a sinister revolutionary
group, but what was actually an elaborate delusional system with no

basis in reality.58
As expected, the prosecution attempted to show guilty intent by

introducing evidence of Oxford's rational behavior prior to the crime.
He had bought pistols and bullets and had practiced firing the pistols.
Just as predictably, defense counsel tried to prove Oxford's insanity by

parading before the court a troop of witnesses, both lay and professional," willing to attest to the same. 5 The case is notable not for the
testimony or strategy but for the judge's instructions to the jury, be-

cause it is at this junction that the departure from precedent began. In
part, Lord Chief Justice Denman of the Central Criminal Court informed the jury that the issue to be considered was the nature and
effect of Oxford's mental "disease":
[T]he very important question comes, whether the prisoner was of unsound mind at the time when the act was done? Persons prima facie
must be taken to be of sound mind till the contrary is shewn. But a
person may commit a criminal act, and yet not be responsible. If some
controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within him which he
could not resist, then he will not be responsible. . . .[U]pon the whole,

three days later, he was asked if he had any last words, but was cut short when he began speaking
of Russia.").
51. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield expressly rejected a defense based on such a type of insanity. Bellingham, 54 O.B.S.P. at 273 (Mansfield, L.C.J., jury charge); see also G. COLLINSON,
supra note 44, at 672 (same).
52. 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1840).
53. See id. at 527-30, 173 Eng. Rep. at 942-43 (Campbell, Att'y Gen., opening statement);
id. at 537-38, 173 Eng. Rep. at 946 (Taylor, defense counsel, opening statement).
54. Id. at 541, 173 Eng. Rep. at 948. Lord Chief Justice Denman, in commenting to the
jury upon the value of the professional testimony, said:
It may be that medical men may be more in the habit of observing cases of this kind than
other persons; and there may be cases in which medical testimony may be essential; but I
cannot agree with the notion that moral insanity can be better judged by medical men than
by others.
Id. at 547, 173 Eng. Rep. at 950 (Denman, L.C.J., jury charge).
55.bySee
id. at 539-41,
173 Eng. Rep. at 947-48 (summary of testimony for the defense).
Published
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the question will be, whether all that has been proved about the prisoner
at the bar shews that he was insane at the time when the act was
done-whether the evidence given proves a disease in the mind as of a
person quite incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. ... The
question is, whether the prisoner was labouring under that species of insanity which satisfies you that he was quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences of the act he was committing, or, in other words,
whether he was under the influence of a diseased mind, and was really
unconscious at the time he was committing the act, that it was a crime."
The Judge's charge, and the defense counsel's witnesses, were apparently persuasive. The jury found Oxford guilty of firing two pistols,
but also found that he was insane. " The judge ordered that he be sent
to an insane asylum. Twenty-seven years later, Oxford was released
upon his agreement to leave England."
The instructions in Oxford laid out a formula that would presage
the test in M'Naghten. The defense, it would seem, would be successful
if it satisfied either one of two categories of insanity. The first was the
clear "right-from-wrong" test, which demonstrated the cognitive aspect
of the insanity defense." An individual "incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong'" because of "a disease in the mind" was insane and
would be acquitted for that reason. 0 The second category introduced
unconsciousness as a successful insanity defense. 1 Presumably, this
would be comparable in modern psychiatric parlance to a dissociative
disorder."2 In any case, if the person acted without awareness of acting
because of a disease of the mind, the conclusion was that he was
insane.
It is difficult to understand how a bona fide delusional system of
the type that Oxford" or Bellingham" suffered from would fit into ei-

56. Id. at 546-47, 173 Eng. Rep. at 950 (Denman, L.C.J., jury charge).
57. Id. at 548, 551, 173 Eng. Rep. at 950-51, 952 (jury verdict).
58. T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 22.
59. Id. at 50.
60. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. at 547, 173 Eng. Rep. at 950 (Denman, L.C.J., jury charge).
61. Id. (Denman, L.C.J., jury charge).
62. See generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 253-60
(3rd ed. 1980). The introduction to the section on dissociative disorders begins as follows:
The essential feature [of a dissociative disorder] is a sudden, temporary alteration in
the normally integrative functions of consciousness, identity, or motor behavior. If the alteration occurs in consciousness, important personal events cannot be recalled. If it occurs
in identity, either the individual's customary identity is temporarily forgotten and a new
identity is assumed, or the customary feeling of one's own reality is lost and replaced by a
feeling of unreality. If the alteration occurs in motor behavior, there is also a concurrent
disturbance in consciousness or identity . . ..
Id. at 253.
63. See supra text accompanying note 53.
64. See supra text accompanying note 45.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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ther of the Oxford court's categories of insanity. It has been shown
that one suffering from such a mental derangement can both distinguish right from wrong and be aware of his actions." In any case,
M'Naghten would subsequently settle the issue by holding that a defendant who claimed insanity based upon delusion was to be judged "as
if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.""
Under M'Naghten, then, Oxford and Bellingham should probably have
received the same jury verdict.6 7
B.

The Insanity Defense in Pre-Clark Ohio Law

With the conclusion of Oxford, the Ohio judiciary considering
Clark could look to the English courts for guidance and find the cognitive prong of the insanity test firmly established. In addition, court and
counsel in Clark were able to identify and cite a smattering of American cases that discussed the issue of insanity in general."8 However,
none of these American cases dealt with a standard for insanity in the
criminal law context. 69
It should be noted, though, that one of the three reported Ohio
cases prior to Clark in which insanity was an issue7 0 could have provided some guidance to the Clark court in formulating an insanity test.
In State v. Thompson,7 1 Judge John Wright of the Ohio Supreme
65. See generally I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (W.
Overholder ed. 1962) (ist ed. 1838).
66. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211, 8 Eng. Rep. at 723 (statement of Lord Chief Justice
Tindal).
67. The M'Naghten opinion stated:
For example, if under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the
act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in selfdefence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had
inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such
supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.
Id. (statement of Lord Chief Justice Tindal).
68. See Clark, 12 Ohio at 485-86 (summary of appellate arguments of both parties) (citing
Harrison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 658 (C.C.D.N.J. 1820) (No. 6141); Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn.
203 (1822); Dickinson v. Baker, 9 Mass. 225 (1812); Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371 (1811);
Buckminster v. Perry, 4 Mass. 593 (1808); Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330 (1807); Wogan v.
Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle 141 (Pa. 1824; Irish v. Smith, 8 Serg. & Rawle 573 (Pa. 1822); Rambler v. Tryon, 7 Serg. & Rawle 90 (Pa. 1821)).
69. See, e.g., Wogan, I1 Serg. & Rawle at 141 (propriety of inquiry into a testator's fitness
of mind). However, there were extant at the time of the Clark decision a number of reported
American cases applying a version of the "right-from-wrong" test thatpredated M'Naghten. See
Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and
Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227
(1966). Most of the cases mentioned were from local courts in New York City. See id. at
1247-56.
70. See State v. Thompson, Wright 617 (Ohio 1834); State v. Gardiner, Wright 392 (Ohio
1833); Wallace v. Bevard, Wright 114 (Ohio 1832).
71. byWright
617 (Ohio
1834).
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Court7 2 instructed the jury:
If [the facts] satisfy you that when the prisoner struck the deceased he
was laboring under insanity, or, such an estrangement of mind as left
him without discretion to discern the difference between good and evil, or
unconscious that he was doing wrong, he should be acquitted altogether.

But, on the other hand, if his mind was such, that he retained the power
of discriminating, or to leave him conscious he was doing wrong, a state
of mind in which at the time of the deed, he was free to forbear, or to do
the act, he is responsible as a sane man. 8
By declaring that sanity includes "free[dom] to forbear or to do the
act," Judge Wright anticipated the elements of the Ohio test as enunciated in Clark.74 Interestingly, the Clark court failed to mention the
Thompson decision and-in fact-no reported Ohio case has ever applied or even cited Thompson as a test for insanity.75
In sum, the situation in Ohio prior to Clark showed meager reported case law from beyond the English shore that could provide guidance to a young judiciary seeking to formulate a standard for the defense of insanity. Given this scarcity of case law, Ohio Supreme Court
Judge Matthew Birchard-the author of the Clark jury charge-chose
to discuss considerable secondary authority on the issue of insanity
when he wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in bank upholding the
trial court's decision in Clark. His enlightened discussion on the nature
of insanity suggests that he must have been a probing scholar in his
76
own right.
72. The then-common practice of Supreme Court judges presiding at trials is discussed infra note 91.
73. Thompson, Wright at 646 (Wright, J., jury charge).
74. Compare id. with Clark, 12 Ohio at 494 n.(a) (reprinting jury charge) (defendant accused of first-degree murder cannot be convicted unless it can be shown that he is "a free agent,
capable of acting or of abstaining from action-free to embrace the right and reject the wrong.").
75. Thompson has been cited by the Ohio Supreme Court for the proposition that firstdegree murder requires proof of deliberation and premeditation. See Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98,
112 (1857); cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 483 n.6 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
In addition, both Thompson and Clark have been categorized by some courts and commentators as early examples of the "irresistible-impulse" test. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 30 P.2d 1041,
1046 (Ore. 1934); Kuh, The Insanity Defense-an Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 771, 786 (1961-1962).
The Ohio Supreme Court has rejected any comparison of the Ohio test to the "irresistibleimpulse" test. State v. Staten (Staten I), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 22 n.8., 247 N.E.2d 293, 299 n.8
(1969), overruled in part as stated in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354
(1977). The "irresistible-impulse" test and its lack of acceptance in Ohio is discussed infra notes
154-66 and accompanying text.
76. Of Judge Birchard's public service during the years before he became a member of the
Ohio Supreme Court, it has been written:
Matthew Birchard was born at Becket, Massachusetts, in 1803, and came to Ohio at the
age of eight with his parents, who settled in Trumbull County, near the town of Warren.
After the preparatory course of study he was admitted to the bar in 1827, and six years
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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III.
A.

INCIPIENT PRECEDENT: M'NAGHTEN AND CLARK

M'Naghten's Case7 7 and the "Right-from-Wrong" Test

On March 4, 1843, an English court found Daniel M'Naghten not
guilty by reason of insanity for the shooting death of Edward Drummond, private secretary to Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel. 78 The
M'Naghten test for insanity was not formulated by the trial court; instead, it was conceived in the opinion of the panel of judges summoned
by the House of Lords after the trial largely in response to widespread
negative reaction to the M'Naghten jury's findings.7 9 Asked to respond
to five questions on the issue of the insanity defense, the judges pronounced an answer that can still be heard in one form or another in
every American courtroom today:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.80
The immediate value of the M'Naghten test was that it made
room for partial insanity, disposing of the difficult cases like
M'Naghten, where the medical evidence suggested that Daniel
M'Naghten suffered from
a [morbid] delusion which carried him away beyond the power of his
own control, and left him no . . .perception [of right and wrong]; and
that he was not capable of exercising any control over acts which had
connexion with his delusion: that it was of the nature of the disease with
which the [defendant] was affected, to go on gradually until it had
reached a climax, when it burst forth with irresistible intensity: that a
man might go on for years quietly, though at the same time under its
influence, but would all at once break out into the most extravagant and
violent paroxysms.81

later was elected judge of the Common Pleas. He was a Jackson Democrat and interested
sufficiently in politics to turn aside from the main drift of his life and leave the leadership
of the Common Pleas circuit to accept the commissionership of the general land office
tendered him by President Jackson. His written opinions are characterized by felicity of
expression and perspicuity of thought.
I E. MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 244 (1934).
77. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
78. See id. at 202, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720.
79. See T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 30-32.
80. M'Naghten, 10 CI. & Fin. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722 (statement of Lord Chief Justice
Tindal), quoted in T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 32-33.
81. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 201-02, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
The part of the opinion of the judges that came to be known as the M'Naghten rule did not
itself specifically
discuss delusion,
Published
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The temporary but all-consuming nature of Daniel M'Naghten's insanity fell within the test's provision that the defendant must be insane

"at the time of the committing of the act." ' 2
The long-term effect of M'Naghten was to solidify the "right-

from-wrong" test, giving jurists a formula to apply for years to come.
The test in fact has two parts: a defendant may be found insane if he

either "does not know the nature and quality of his act" or "does not
know right from wrong."88 Although the first phrase, "nature and quality of his act," is a "broader and more inclusive concept,"8 " courts have
usually preferred the "right-from-wrong" phrase of the test. 5
The general theme of the M'Naghten test emphasizes knowledge
and ignores self-control; this irrelevance of self-control is one of the
grounds upon which M'Naghten has received considerable comment,
most of it critical.88 Today, while the legal community recognizes the
word "know" in its cognitive, intellectual scope, the psychiatric profession, called to expound as experts on the mental conditions of defendants, takes the word as connoting a broader and fuller knowledge embracing emotional processes.87 The practical effect of the narrower
legal definition is that a great many people who are seriously disturbed
would be precluded from establishing a successful insanity defense.

Recognizing this, courts embracing M'Naghten have often adopted a
broad construction of the term "know" 88 and ignored the narrow wording of M'Naghten. The test is generally applied to all types of mental
aberrations; thus, emotional and delusional disorders are merely special
subcategories that still fall within the ambit of the rule. 9
Despite the extensive debate M'Naghten would trigger, the House
of Lords had its answer and the test to which the English judiciary

tion. In a separate response, the judges stated that partial delusion was not exculpatory when the
defendant "knew he was acting contrary to law." See id. at 209, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722 (statement of
Lord Chief Justice Tindal); see also id. at 211, 8 Eng. Rep. at 223 (statement of Lord Chief
Justice Tindal) (the guilt of a defendant operating under a delusion should be judged on the basis
of the facts as he perceives them) (discussed supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text).
82. Id. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722 (statement of Lord Chief Justice Tindal).
83. See, e.g., State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949); Commonwealth v. Heller,
369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); see also Annotation, supra note 6, at 529.
84. See, e.g., Annotation, Modern Status of the M'Naghten "Right-and-Wrong" Test of
Criminal Responsibility, 45 A.L.R.2D 1447, 1451 n.2 (1956) (citing Weihofen, The M'Naghten
Rule in Its Present-Day Setting, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1953, at 8).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109 (1964); Platt & Diamond, supra note 68, at 1247; see also Annotation, supra note 84, at 1456.
87. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 326 (1955).
88. Weihofen, supra note 84, at 8 (courts seldom delve deeply into the definition of
"knowledge").
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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thereafter proclaimed its allegiance. The M'Naghten test would prove
to be a trenchant tool in the hands of judges eager to pare the insane
from the sane. It did not matter in 1843 that over one hundred years
would pass before the test would be broadened enough in application to
encompass all those it was intended to benefit.
B.

Clark v. State9" and the Free-Will Test

The facts in the Clark opinion are sparse. It is known that William Clark was on trial for the murder of Cyrus Sells, but their relationship and the circumstances surrounding the crime were not reported. The case was heard in a jury trial before two judges of the Ohio
Supreme Court on circuit 1 in Franklin County; a verdict of "guilty of
murder in the first degree" was returned, and a sentence of death pronounced. 2 Judge Birchard's charge to the jury, which had been set
down in writing and approved by the other judges of the supreme court
before trial, 93 contained the touchstone for determination of the insanity defense that Ohio courts in years to come would proffer or reject.9 4 The relevant portion of the charge, reprinted as a footnote to the
opinion of the supreme court in bank, was stated as follows:
"The statute defining the crime, is in these words:-"If any person shall
purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated malice, kill another, every
such person shall be guilty of murder in the first degree." The words
purposely, of deliberate and premeditated malice, as applied to the act
of killing, have much meaning. Purposely implies an act of the will; an

90. 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (in bank), overruled in part in Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146,
154-55, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) and in part in State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317, 322, 73 N.E. 218,
219 (1904).
91. The organization of the Ohio Judiciary before 1851 provided for "[t]he supreme court
in bank, [which denoted the] sessions of the court at the capitol, composed of all four judges of
the state, and the . . . supreme court, [which denoted] the sessions held in the several counties by
two of the judges of the supreme court in bank." Webster v. State, 43 Ohio St. 696, 699 (1885);
cf. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. Il1, §§ 1-2. Under this system, supreme court judges served both as
trial and appellate judges, often serving in both roles on the same case. For example, Judge
Birchard presided at the Clark trial and later wrote the appellate opinion of the supreme court in
bank. See Clark, 12 Ohio at 483, 487.
The Ohio judiciary was reorganized in 1851. "[Tlhe [Ohio] [Clonstitution of 1851 provided
that [the modern supreme court] was to be the successor of the supreme court in bank, and that
the district court [later designated circuit courts, and now courts of appeals] should be the successor of the supreme court." Webster, 43 Ohio St. at 699 (emphasis omitted) (discussing OHIO
CONSr. schedule, § 12; id. art. IV, § 1 (1851, amended 1883) (providing for district courts)).
Later amendments to the Ohio Constitution changed the designation of intermediate state courts
from district courts to circuit courts, and later from circuit courts to courts of appeal. See OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1912, amended 1968) (courts of appeal); id. (1883, amended 1912) (circuit
courts).
92. Clark, 12 Ohio at 484.
93. Id. at 494 n.(a).
94. See infra notes 121-216 and accompanying text.
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intention; a design to do the act. It presupposes the free agency of the
actor. Deliberationand premeditation require action of the mind. They
are operations of the intellectual faculties, and require an exercise of reason, reflection, judgment and decision, and can not happen in any case
where the faculties of the mind are deranged, destroyed, or do not exist.
The crime of murder in the first degree can, therefore, only be perpetrated by a free agent, capable of acting or of abstaining from action-free to embrace the right and to reject the wrong. He must have a
sound intellect, capable of reason, reflection, premeditation, and under
the control of the will.95
Under Judge Birchard's charge to the jury, the requisite elements
of first-degree murder (or what would be aggravated murder under
current Ohio law) 96 are negated where there is a lack of free will, or
"where the faculties of the mind are deranged, destroyed, or do not
exist."' 97 In other words, the mens rea of the crime must be absent.
Exculpation from the crime does not necessarily come from lack of
knowledge of what is right or wrong, but from lack of capacity to act
or abstain from a certain behavior. While the element of knowledge
may be read into the requirement that a person have a "sound intellect"" 8 to be declared sane, this too is under the control of free will:
impliedly, a test of capacity to "embrace the right and reject the
wrong" 99 is first a test of knowledge of what it is that is right or wrong,
and secondly a test of capacity to choose what is right. Thus, the
charge to the jury set out a two-part test that 126 years later would
become the foundation of Ohio's current insanity defense. 10 0
The assignments of error in Clark related to evidentiary issues regarding the competency of lay witnesses to give opinion testimony as to
a defendant's sanity and the admissibility of the testimony of the one
professional, a physician, on the ultimate issue of the "defendant's general knowledge of right and wrong."'' In rejecting the application for
a writ of error, Judge Birchard cited cases supporting the general rule
that lay witnesses were permitted to testify as to sanity' 2 and quoted a
Massachusetts case in holding that professional witnesses may be properly questioned on their opinion as to the soundness of mind of the

95. Clark, 12 Ohio at 494 n.(a) (reprint of jury charge).
96. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1987).
97. Clark, 12 Ohio at 494 n.(a) (reprint of jury charge).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See State v. Staten (Staten I), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 21, 247 N.E.2d 293, 299 (1969),
overruled in part as stated in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977)
(discussed infra note 214). The Staten test is quoted infra text accompanying note 214.
101. Clark, 12 Ohio at 485.
102. Id. at 493-94 (discussing cases cited supra note 67).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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defendant if they "state the circumstances or symptoms from which
they drew their conclusions." 103

Judge Birchard spent a good deal of the opinion discussing secondary authority drawn from writers on medical jurisprudence. The purpose, apparently, was not only to explain what was admissible in testimony on the issue of insanity, but also to present learned opinion on the
nature of insanity itself. Conjecturally, then, it would seem that Judge
Birchard was setting the stage for readers to understand his charge to
the jury, which he appended to the Clark opinion. 1 ' For example, he
quoted the Englishman Leonard Shelford, Esq., as saying that "insanity is a disease of the mind, which assumes as many and various
forms as there are shades of difference in the human character." 105 He
also cited the English physician, John Haslam, for the familiar proposition that the determination of insanity is an inexact process that often
leads to differing opinions by professionals diagnosing the same case. 106
In the motion for a writ of error, the attorneys for William Clark
0
cite, inter alia, the English barrister Joseph Chitty.1'
In A Practical
08
Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence,1 Chitty had repeated the entrenched cognitive element of the insanity defense by asking
"[w]hether, at the time the alleged criminal act was committed, the
prisoner was incapable of judging between right and wrong, and did
not then know he was committing an offence against the law of God
and of Nature?"' 09
Presumably, then, by the time of Clark, Judge Birchard was thoroughly familiar with the established insanity rule of the day, which
stressed knowledge of right from wrong. It can also be presumed that
the judge was familiar with another book cited by Clark's attorneys,
the influential A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudenceof Insanity."'

In this work, the American physician Isaac Ray cites numerous anecdotal cases where the patient was perfectly lucid and aware of the
wrong. He describes this condition of "moral mania," a subspecies of
the more generic diagnosis of insanity, as follows:
Thus far mania has been considered as affecting the intellectual faculties
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 487-88 (quoting Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371, 372 (1811)).
See id. at 494 n.(a) (reprint of jury charge).
Id. at 489 (quoting L. SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING
LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 38 (London 1833)).
106. Id. at 489-90 (citing J. HASLAM, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO INSANITY ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 5 (1817 London & photo. reprint 1979)).
107. See id. at 487 (summary of argument of appellant).
108. J.CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (Philadelphia 1836).
109. Id. at 354.
110. I. RAY, supra note 65, cited in Clark, 12 Ohio at 486 (summary of argument of
appellant).
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only; but a more serious error on this subject can scarcely be committed
than that of limiting its influence to them. It will not be denied that the
propensities and sentiments are also integral portions of our mental constitution; and no enlightened physiologist can doubt that their manifestations are dependent on the cerebral organism. Here then we have the
only essential conditions of insanity-a material structure connected
with mental manifestations; and until it is satisfactorily proved that this
structure enjoys a perfect immunity from morbid action, we are bound to
believe that it is liable to disease, and consequently, that the affective as
well as intellectual faculties are subject to derangement."'
And furthermore:
It is clear . . .that mania may exist uncomplicated with mental delusion; it is in fact only a kind of mental exaltation, . . a state in which
the reason has lost its empire over the passions and the actions by which
they are manifested, to such a degree that the individual can neither
repass the former, nor abstain from the latter. It does not follow that he
may not be in possession of his senses and even his usual intelligence,
since, in order to resist the impulses of the passions, it is not sufficient
that the reason should impart its counsels; we must have the necessary
power to obey them. The maniac may judge correctly of his actions without being in a condition to repress his passions, and to abstain from the
acts of violence to which they impel him.""
Regardless of the source, it is apparent that Judge Birchard was
influenced by those who felt that insanity was more than the knowledge
of right from wrong. That there existed at the time of Clark ample
medical authority supporting this fact is undisputed. That this was also
the minority view jurisprudentially before M'Naghten, and a view that
would be overwhelmed by the force of M'Naghten after its pronouncement, is also hardly open to doubt. Commenting on the judicial inability to thus conform to then-current medical opinion, Ray wrote:
Few, probably, whose attention has not been particularly directed to the
subject, are aware how far the condition of the law relative to insanity is
behind the present state of our knowledge concerning that disease. While
so much has been done within a comparatively short period to promote
the comfort of the insane, and so much improvement has been effected in
the methods of treating their disorder as to have deprived it of half its
terrors, it is both a curious and a melancholy fact that so little has been
accomplished towards regulating their personal and social rights, by
more correct and enlightened principles of jurisprudence."'

111. I. RAY, supra note 65, at 127.
112. Id. at 131.
113. Id. at 5.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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For the next 126 years, Ohio courts often followed the pack by
straying to M'Naghten.
IV.

JUDICIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA: CLARK OR M'NAGHTEN, THAT WAS
THE QUESTION

The first American case to espouse the rule of law on insanity as
laid down by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case" 4 was the 1844
Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Rogers'1 8 wherein Chief Justice Shaw cited an English case that reprinted and relied upon
M'Naghten. 16 Three years later, the MNaghten name appeared in the
New York case of Freeman v. People,1 7 which adopted the "rightfrom-wrong" test.'1 8 Surprisingly, M'Naghten itself did not appear in
any Ohio case until 1942119 although the "right-from-wrong" standard
itself was widely discussed by that time.120
The first Ohio case to cite Clark v. State"' was State v. Summons 22 (1852), heard in the District Court of Hamilton County. In
this insanity defense case, Ohio Supreme Court Judge Allen Thurman,
later a United States Senator, agreed that Judge Birchard's charge to
the jury in Clark was the proper instruction; however, he contradicted
the element of free agency embodied in the Clark test and repeated the
traditional, unidimensional "right-from-wrong" test by instructing the
jury that "a man is not to be excused from responsibility if he has
capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between
right and wrong[,] . . .a knowledge and consciousness that what he is
doing is wrong."'' 2
In spite of Judge Birchard's attempt to fashion a rule that went
beyond the simple "right-from-wrong" test, the next insanity defense
case heard by the Ohio Supreme Court did not embrace his effort. In

114.
115.

10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844).
116. Id. at 502 n.*(Shaw, J., jury charge) (citing Regina v. Higginson, I Car. & K. 129,
130 n.(a), 174 Eng. Rep. 743, 744 n.(a) (Stafford Assizes 1843) (reprinting MNaghten)).
117. 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
118. Id. at 29 (citing M'Naghten).
119. See State v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 242, 43 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1942) (citing
M'Naghten).
120. See, e.g., Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857); State v. Summons, I Ohio Dec.
Reprint 416 (Dist. Ct. 1852), affd, 5 Ohio St. 325 (1856).
121. 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (in bank), overruled in part in Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146,
154-55, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) and in part in State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317, 322, 73 N.E. 218,
219 (1904).
122. 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 416, 423 (Dist. Ct. 1852) (Thurman, J., jury charge) (citing
Clark), affd, 5 Ohio St. 325 (1856).
123. 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 423 (Thurman, J., jury charge) (quoting Rogers. 48 Mass. (7
Met.) at 502 n.* (Shaw, J.,
jury charge)).
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Farrer[sic] v. State,12 " decided ten years after Clark, the defendant, a

young female nurse,"2 5 entered a plea of insanity upon being charged
with murder in the poisoning of an eight-year-old boy under her care.
Evidence suggested, in fact, that altogether five people in her care had
died as a result of ingesting large quantities of arsenic. Her subsequent

conviction was appealed because of jury misconduct.'26 Affidavits
showed that jury members had been rather relaxed about their duty
during deliberations, obtaining liquor for the occasion, conversing about
the case with their friends on the sidewalk below their window, and
reading newspaper accounts of the trial. On this basis, a new trial was

ordered. 27 However, in his separate opinion, Ohio Supreme Court
Judge John Corwin saw fit to comment on the trial court's charge to
the jury regarding the insanity defense. While Judge Corwin cited
Clark as being an acceptable test of insanity, he could find no reason to
disturb the trial court's instruction, which was centered completely on
the "right-from-wrong" test. 28 This cognitive definition, he said, "is

such as we frequently find in the books."' 2 9
In the next insanity defense case heard in Ohio, Loeffner v.
State' 30 (1857), the citation to Clark appears in the trial court's charge

to the jury, which was reprinted in full in the Supreme Court opinion. 1 1 However, even though the high court did not reject the trial
court's emphasis of free agency, it ignored this concept and stuck to the
rigid "right-from-wrong" test." 2 Chief Justice Thomas Bartley, writing
the opinion, stated:
The accused in a criminal case, is not entitled to an acquittal on the
ground of insanity, if at the time of the alleged offense, he had capacity
and reason sufficient left to enable him to distinguish between right and
wrong, and understand the nature of his act, and his relation to the party

124. 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853).
125. The young defendant was described by one judge as "remarkably ugly." Id. at 61
(Corwin, J., concurring in the result).
126. Id. at 54-55 (summary of assignment of error).
127. In separate opinions, three of the five judges of the Ohio Supreme Court concurred in
the result; the only common point of agreement among the three opinions was that jury misconduct warranted a new trial. Id. at 55-57, 69 (Corwin, J., concurring in the result); id. at 73
(Thurman, J., concurring in the result); id. at 77 (Ranney, J., concurring in the result).
128. Id. at 70 (Corwin, J., concurring in the result) (discussing State v. Ferrer, I Ohio Dec.
Reprint 428, 432 (C.P. 1852) (Carter, J., jury charge), rev'd on other grounds, Farrer [sic] v.
State, 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853)).
129. Id. at 70 (Corwin, J.,concurring in the result).
130. 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857), overruled in Staten 1 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16, 247 N.E.2d 293,
296 (1969).
131. See Loeffner, 10 Ohio St. at 605-06 (reprint of jury charge).
132. See id. at 615-16.
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Fouts v. State"" (1857), a fourth case during this period that
cited Clark, was not concerned with the defense of insanity per se but

rather with the precise interpretation of the words "purpose" and "intent" as they were rendered in the then-current Ohio murder statute.1"'
However, there is a clear connection between these artful words and

the cognitive elements of the insanity defense, a connection not explored by the Fouts court. Indeed, there was no reason for the court to
do so, since Mr. Fouts did not assert a defense of insanity. It was
merely stated in Fouts that Clark supports an interpretation of the

murder statute that makes first degree murder a function of intentional, deliberate, and premeditated behavior and makes second degree
murder a function of intentional behavior without the latter two addi-

tional elements of deliberation and premeditation.' 86
If the four preceding cases suggest that Ohio courts were not quite
sure what to do with Clark, whether to embrace it or to reject it, that
interpretation would appear to be correct. Let it simply be said that

some courts did embrace it, some did not, and others confused the issue
beyond hope. An example of the latter situation can be found in a comparison of the two 1867 trials of George Maxwell in the Montgomery
Common Pleas and Superior Courts. In Maxwell's common pleas trial
for the murder of Augustus VanHouten, Judge Smith correctly cited

the Clark test in his jury charge but broadly interpreted the inability to
distinguish right from wrong as necessarily leading to or being the
same as an inability to control one's behavior.""7 By contrast, in Mr.
Maxwell's trial in the superior court

38

for the same offense, Judge Al-

133. Id.
134. 8 Ohio St. 98 (1857).
135. Id. at 112.
136. Id.
137. State v. Maxwell, Dayton 362, 366-67 (C.P. 1867) (Smith, J., jury charge) (citing
Clark, 12 Ohio at 495 n.(a)). Judge Smith stated:
If the mind of a party accused of committing a crime, is so deranged, disordered or
destroyed by disease, or other visitation of God, as to render him wholly incapable of distinguishing or determining between right and wrong; if his mind is so unhinged, his reason
so unbalanced, and his intellectual powers so thoroughly disordered, as to render him incapable of reasoning or reflecting, incompetent to choose the right and reject the wrong, he is
not a free, voluntary agent, and is legally incompetent to commit a crime.
Id. at 366 (Smith, J., jury charge).
138. In addition to the obvious question of why Mr. Maxwell had two separate jury trials
for the same offense, it is also surprising that one of the cases was tried in the Superior Court of
Montgomery County--criminal cases were excluded from the jurisdiction of that court by statute.
See 1856 Ohio Laws 38, repealed, 1885 Ohio Laws 84. There is also some question as to the
identity of the court on which Judge Allen sat: he instructed the jury in the superior court case,
but also rendered a decision for the common pleas court on the issue of bail for Mr. Maxwell. See
State v. Maxwell, Dayton 376 (C.P. 1867) (Allen, J., bail order).
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len did not mention the concept of free will in his jury instruction but
employed instead the traditional, unidimensional "right-from-wrong"
test. 13 9
Still, Clark had utility for the courts of Ohio, because it propounded the rule of evidence that the insanity defense was an affirmative defense.1 40 It was not enough that some evidence of insanity had to
be presented; the burden was on the defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity by a preponderance of the evidence.14 1 This particular aspect of Clark was upheld 4 by Ohio courts until 1977, when the
Supreme Court concluded that it had been superseded by statutory enactment. 143 In addition, Clark is frequently cited as support for the
proposition that a lay witness may testify as to his opinion of a person's
1
sanity as well as to facts relevant to such a determination. 4
It was not until Blackburn v. State145 (1872) that the Ohio Supreme Court upheld Clark, describing it as the "true rule" regarding
the insanity defense. 14 In paragraph four of the syllabus, the Blackburn court stated:
Where the defense of insanity is set up on the trial of an indictment for
murder, it is not error to the prejudice of the accused, to instruct the
jury that the questions to be decided, as regards this defense, are these:
Was the accused a free agent in forming the purpose to kill; was he at
the time capable of judging whether that act was right or wrong; and did
he know at the time that it was an offense against the laws of God and
man?

14

1

This reaffirmation of the Clark free-will test in 1872 would be the
Ohio Supreme Court's last word on the insanity defense until 1948.145

139. State v. Maxwell, Dayton 370, 375 (Super. Ct. 1867) (Allen, J., jury charge).
140. Clark, 12 Ohio at 495 n.(a) (reprint of jury charge).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 203, 291 N.E.2d 432 (1972); Long v. State,
109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923); Silvis v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1871); see also Kelch v.
State, 55 Ohio St. 146, 154-55, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) (Clark does not provide support for imposition of burden of proof greater than preponderance).
143. See State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95 (1977) (discussed infra note 214).
144. See, e.g.. Kettemann v. Metzger, 13-23 Ohio C.C. Dec. 61, 66 (1901) (citing Clark,
12 Ohio at 493-94) (action to set aside will on grounds that testator was mentally incapacitated);
cf. OHIO R. EvID. 701.
145. 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
146. Id. at 165.
147. Id. at 146 para. 4 (syllabus). But see State v. Staten (Staten I), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16,
247 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1969) (questioning the Blackburn formulation of the correct test for insanity, while citing with approval the Blackburn court's statement that the Clark jury charge was
the "true rule"), overruled in part as stated in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364
N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussed infra note 214).
148. See Frohner v. State, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E. 868 (1948) (discussed infra notes
184-85 and accompanying text).
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During the interim years the test espoused in Blackburn and Clark

received a suprisingly uniform application in the lower courts of Ohio.
However, facility with the test was not immediate. In the 1876 case of

State v. Adin,149 an Ohio common pleas court seemingly misconstrued
Clark and Blackburn, instructing the jury on the "right-from-wrong"
test in evaluating the defendant's insanity plea.15 Two years later,
though, the free-will standard was correctly explained and employed in
State v. Bowsher.1 5' In the two decades following Bowsher, the free-

will test was consistently applied in the lower courts of Ohio"5 2 and the
"right-from-wrong" test would not rear its head again until the middle
of the twentieth century.
V.

OHIO'S REACTION TO THE "IRRESISTIBLE-IMPULSE"

TEST AND

THE DURHAM RULE

Although the "right-from-wrong" test would find its way back into
Ohio's court system in 1942,153 it is surprising to note that lower courts
were fairly unified in their resistance to other formulations of the insanity defense such as the "irresistible-impulse" test and the Durham
rule. While the resistance to the latter was stronger than to the former,
neither concept played a leading part on the jurisprudential stage in
Ohio.
A.

The "Irresistible-Impulse" Test

In Parsons v. State'" (1867), the Alabama Supreme Court set
forth a clear and consise formulation of the "irresistible-impulse" test.
The Parsons formulation would discharge a defendant from criminal
resposibility where:
[B]y reason of the duress of. . .mental disease, he had so far lost the
power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act
in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if,
at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental
disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of

149. 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 25 (C.P. 1876).
150. Id. at 27 (Hamilton, J.,jury charge). Judge Hamilton did employ free will in his
description of a defendant who should not be found insane. Id. (Hamilton, J., jury charge) ("[Ilf
his mind was such that he retained the power of discriminating [between right and wrong] ...
[and] was free to forbear or to do-the act, he is responsible as a sane man.").
151. 7 Ohio Dec. Repr. 442, 444 (C.P. 1878) (Minshall, J.,
jury charge).
152. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 13 Ohio C.C. 67 (1896) (quoting with approval Blackburn,
23 Ohio St. at 146), afg 7 Ohio N.P. 458 (C.P. 1895), affd, 55 Ohio St. 685, 48 N.E. 1114
(1896); Cottell v. State, 12 Ohio C.C. 467 (1896); State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio C.C. 94 (1890); State v.
Kalb, 7 Ohio N.P. 547 (C.P. 1894).
153. See State v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 242, 43 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1942) (citing
M'Naghten) (discussed infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text).
81 Ala. 577, 21987
So. 854 (1887).
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it solely.153

At first glance, the concept of "irresistible impulse" might appear
openly similar to Judge Birchard's free-will test; indeed, Judge
Corwin's opinion in Farrer[sic] v. Ohio1" seems to sound a great deal
like "irresistible impulse": "[E]very correct definition of sanity . . .
must suppose freedom of will . . .11
Moreover, in State v.
Adin 1 8 -an 1876 insanity decision that cited no case authority-"irresistible impulse," defined as "a special propensity impelling
[one] to [commit] a particular bad act," 15 9 was held to be an acceptable defense when the defendant is "mentally deranged."1 60 On the
other hand, in State v. Cumberworth'6' (1942), an Ohio appellate
court mistakenly applied M'Naghten-which the court described as the
test that "has been generally accepted by all courts""6 2 but rejected
"irresistible impulse":
To establish insanity as a defense in a criminal prosecution . . . it is not
sufficient that he knew what he was doing was wrong but that because of
disease of mind he did not have power to resist committing the act and
'
therefore acted under "irresistible impulse."163
Rejected as well in numerous modern cases, including State v.
Staten,""' the "irresistible-impulse" test was never able to establish its
domain in Ohio. " ' A footnote in the Staten case made Ohio's position
on the test very clear and pragmatically differentiated it from the "capacity to refrain":
Sometimes, where a defendant lacks the ability to refrain from doing a criminal act, it is stated that his doing it is the result of an irresistible impulse. Such a statement limits the defense of lack of capacity to
refrainfrom doing the act to sudden occurrences; it also suggests that

155. Id. at 597, 2 So. at 866-67. For cases adopting the "irresistible impulse" test, see
generally Annotation, IrresistibleImpulse as an Escape for Crime, 173 A.L.R. 391 (1948).
156. 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853).
157. Id. at 70 (Corwin, J., concurring in the result). Compare id. with Parsons, 81 Ala. at
597, 2 So. at 866-67 (quoted supra text accompanying note 155).
158. 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 25 (C.P. 1876).
159. Id. at 27 (Hamilton, J., jury charge).
160. Id. (Hamilton, J.,jury charge).
161. 69 Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E.2d 510 (1942).
162. Id. at 242, 43 N.E.2d at 511.
163. Id. at 239, 43 N.E.2d at 510 (syllabus).
164. (Staten 1), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 20-22, 247 N.E.2d 293, 299-300 (1969), overruled in
part as stated in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussed infra
note 214).
165. See also State v. Schaffer, 113 Ohio App. 125, 177 N.E.2d 534 (1960); State v. Ross,
92 Ohio App. 2d 29, 108 N.E.2d 77, appeal dismissedfor want of debatable question, 158 Ohio
St. 248, 108 N.E.2d 282 (1952).
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there may be a defense where a defendant momentarily becomes angry
and loses control over himself. Fortunately, our [supreme) court has
never used the term "irresistible impulse."'"

B.

The Durham Rule

The roots of the Durham rule 16 7 can be found in the scholarly
works of Dr. Isaac Ray. '8s In A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence
6 9 Ray
of Insanity,1
argued that the appropriate legal position on insanity would be to replace all existing tests with some equivalent of the
French Penal Code, which stated that "there is no crime nor offence
when the accused was in a state of madness at the time of the action. '17 0 This belief was later adopted by a correspondent of Dr. Ray's,
New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Charles Doe, 1 who incorporated Ray's theme into his concurrence in State v. Pike7 2 and into the
7
1
jury instructions he gave at the trial level in State v. Jones.1
Almost a century later, Judge David Bazelon of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit echoed the Ray
position in the case of Durham v. United States.17 4 Judge Bazelon's
ruling was disarmingly attractive for its simplicity: "An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
17 5
disease or mental defect."
But, suffice it to say that this radical departure from the traditional tests for insanity made hardly a ripple in Ohio judicial thinking.
Although Durham was briefly cited in Columbus v. Zanders,7 6 a 1970

166. Staten 1. 18 Ohio St. 2d at 22 n.8, 247 N.E.2d at 299 n.8 (emphasis added).
167. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease
or mental defect"), overruled in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(en banc) (holding the Durham test overly inclusive and adopting instead the Model Penal Code
test).
168. See Durham, 214 F.2d at 870. The works of Dr. Ray are discussed supra notes 110-13
& infra notes 169-74.
169. 1. RAY, supra note 65.
170. Id. at 27 & n. 21 (quoting and translating CODE PtNAL art. 64 (Fr.) ("II n'y a ni
crime ni d6lit lorsque le pr6venu 6tait en 6tat de d6mence au temps de l'action")), quoted in T.
MAEDER, supra note 31, at 43.
171. See T. MAEDER, supra note 31, at 43-47 (detailing the two men's views on the insanity
defense, which was the subject of their correspondence).
172. 49 N.H. 399, 443 (1869) (Doe, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds in Hardy
v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 227 (1875).
173. 50 N.H. 369, 394 (1871) (quoting jury charge).
174. 214 F.2d 862, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (citing 1.RAY, supra note 65), overruled in
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (discussed supra note
167).
175. Durham, 214 F.2d at 875.
176. 25 Ohio Misc. 144, 266 N.E.2d 602 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1970).
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municipal court case involving violation of an ordinance prohibiting the
wearing of clothing of the opposite sex, the Durham rule was criticized
rejected by
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Staten1" and was expressly
8
the court two months later in State v. Crampton.1
VI.

THE CONTEMPORARY FOUNDATION OF THE STATEN DECISION

79
The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Staten pays ap8
propriate homage to Clark v. State'8 0 and Farrerv. State.' ' In addi182
tion, Staten criticizes the early contrary case of Loeffner v. State,
noting that "Loeffner. .. does not mention the inability of a defendant
to refrain from doing a criminal act as excusing him from criminal
responsibility therefor."' 8
By his acknowledgment of these cases, Chief Justice Kingsley
Taft, author of the Staten opinion, traced the lineage of the Staten
insanity test back to 1843 and to the thoughts of Judge Birchard. However, as has been shown so far, the free-will test for criminal insanity
was not always uniformly applied in the lower courts of Ohio. After
Clark in 1843, the thread of Judge Birchard's charge to his jury was
occasionally frayed and broken. It was not until 1948 and the case of
State v. Frohner'" that the Ohio Supreme Court began to weave together the strands of this judicial thread into a solid opinion on the
insanity defense.
In Frohner, the supreme court held in the syllabus that "[a] person accused of crime who knows and recognizes the difference between
right and wrong in respect of the crime with which he is charged, and
has ability to choose the right and abjure the wrong, is legally
sane." 1 85 Although Clark was not cited in Frohner,the Frohner court's
determination of sanity clearly includes volition, and therefore is compatible with the doctrine of free agency expressed by Judge Birchard.
Furthermore, in the 1964 case of State v. Stewart, 86 the supreme

177. Staten 1,18 Ohio St. 2d at 18, 247 N.E.2d at 297.
178. 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 185, 248 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1969), affid, 402 U.S. 183 (1971),
vacated in part per curiam, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
179. (Staten 1), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969), overruled inpart as stated in
State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussed infra note 214).
180. 12 Ohio 483 (1843), cited with approval in Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 15, 247 N.E.2d
at 295-96.
181. 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853), cited with approval in Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 16, 247
N.E.2d at 296.
182. 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857), overruled inStaten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 16, 247 N.E.2d at
296.
183. Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 16, 247 N.E.2d at 296.
184. 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E. 868 (1948).
185. Id. at 55 para. 15, 80 N.E.2d at 871 para. 15 (syllabus) (emphasis added).
186. 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
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court found it necessary to affirm Frohner by claiming it to be the test
for legal sanity in Ohio. Perhaps the court felt moved to do so because,
in intervening cases, some lower courts had shown an independent
streak in clinging to their own formulae for the insanity defense. For
example, the 1952 case of State v. Ross 87 embraced the "right-fromwrong" test, 88 as did the 1960 case of State v. Schaffer. 89 Not all
courts ignored Frohner; responding to charges that Frohner was too
narrow and that Durham should be adopted, an appellate court in
State v. Robinson 9 ' (1958) stated
If [the Frohner] rule is outmoded in the light of modern development in
the field of psychiatry and for that reason a new and different rule
should be adopted, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme
Court of Ohio is the only tribunal to make such change ....
Adherence to this rule is necessary to preserve the certainty, the
stability and the symmetry of our jurisprudence. 91
Those hoping that the Ohio judiciary at all levels would come to a
consensus on the application of a proper insanity defense after the supreme court's 1964 pronouncement in Stewart must have been disappointed with State v. Colby,' 9' a 1966 common pleas decision. In that
case, M'Naghten and Clark were implicitly cited as synonymous:"'3
Now the court noted that after each of the psychiatrists had completed
narrating his observations and conclusions concerning the mental condition of the defendant, based upon many and varied signs and symptoms
of significance to specialists in their field, each doctor was asked to compress his final conclusion into the straight jacket popularly known as the
M'Naghten Rules, that is, the knowledge of right and wrong test, as

187. 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77, appeal dismissed for want of debatable question,
158 Ohio St. 248, 108 N.E.2d 282 (1952).
188. 92 Ohio App. at 46, 108 N.E.2d at 87.
189. 113 Ohio App. 125, 132, 177 N.E.2d 534, 539 (1960).
190. 83 Ohio L. Abs. 259, 168 N.E.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1958).
191. Id. at 262, 168 N.E.2d at 331.
192. 6 Ohio Misc. 19, 215 N.E.2d 65 (C.P. 1966) (per curiam).
193. It is hard to fault the Colby court for confusing the two cases, considering that the
Ohio Supreme Court itself had made a similar mistake one year earlier in Krauter v. Maxwell, 3
Ohio St. 3d 142, 209 N.E.2d 571 (1965). In Krauter, Justice Paul Brown quoted the Frohner test
but labelled it the "so called McNaughten's [sic] test [which is] the test of legal sanity [in Ohio]."
Id. at 144, 209 N.E.2d at 573 (citing M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843) & quoting Frohner, 150 Ohio St. at 55, 80 N.E.2d at 871 (syllabus)).
At least the Krauter court applied the correct test. That same year, a panel of the federal
sixth circuit actually stated that "the M'Naghten test ... is in effect in Ohio." Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664, 672 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Ross, 92 Ohio App. at 46, 108 N.E.2d at 87).
In 1981, an appellate court repeated the Krauter error, this time quoting Staten, which the
court claimed was "rooted in the so-called M'Naghten rule." State v. Grandstaff, No. C-800193,
slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App., Hamilton County March 11, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file).
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applied in Ohio since Clark v. State .... 194

Then, after applying M'Naghten to the case, the court proceeded
to criticise it for its obsolescence and to recommend that the Model
9
One wonders where the three judges on
Penal Code test be adopted.9'
the court had been spending their time. None of the cases mentioned in
this article (other than M'Naghten) were cited in Colby.'" Moreover,
there was no awareness whatsoever of the route the insanity defense
had taken through the Ohio courts since 1843. In view of its unenlightenment, the court makes an ironic plea:
The Court is convinced, however, that, having carefully examined into
all facets of the "right and wrong" test, it has a duty to speak out on the
subject of Ohio's legal test for insanity in criminal cases. Unless and
until some trial court under proper circumstances has the courage to
point the way to a better method of submitting to the triers of the facts
the issue of the insanity of the accused when insanity is tendered as a
defense, then Ohio will continue to adhere to criteria which more and
more are challenged as being false." 7

While Colby makes it clear that some trial court judges had failed
to get the message on what was an acceptable insanity defense in Ohio,
State v. Keaton"' (1967) suggests that the intermediate courts might
have been more in tune with emerging developments on the insanity
defense in Ohio. The Keaton court rejected the call of defense counsel
for adoption of the Model Penal Code test, pointing out that the jury
instruction given by the trial court, which was based on the Stewart
test, was more favorable to the defendant anyway.'"

194. Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. at 21, 215 N.E.2d at 66 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 22, 215 N.E.2d at 67 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) (quoted
supra note 6)).
196. The Colby court did cite an Ohio Jurisprudence 2d annotation on the subject. See
Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. at 21, 215 N.E.2d at 66 (citing 0. JUR. 2D Homicide § 77). However, the
annotation itself described the test for insanity in "right-from-wrong" terms: "The general test
...is whether the accused's mind was so afflicted with disease as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong as to the particular act done .
0. JUR. 2D Homicide
0..."
§ 77, at 620 (1957). This seeming confusion on the insanity standard is even more inexplicable
when one considers that the footnote to the "right-from-wrong" language at this point, after citing
to State v. Thompson, Wright 617 (Ohio 1834); Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857); State
v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 25 (C.P. 1876), cites both Clark and Blackburn as "the test of
insanity given in some cases" and proceeds to quote the Clark free-will test word for word. 0. JUR.
2D Homicide, supra, § 77, at 620 n. 11.It also mentions the Frohner test. See id. at 620-21.
While one can only guess as to whether the supplements to the annotation available to the
Colby court in 1966 removed the confusion in the volume itself, one can be reassured that the
Ohio Jurisprudence 3d annotation did cite the correct test and cases. See 0. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 48 (1981).
197. Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. at 22, 215 N.E.2d at 67.
198. 9 Ohio App. 2d 139, 223 N.E.2d 631 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 971 (1968).
199. 9 Ohio App. 2d at 149, 223 N.E.2d at 637-38 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE §
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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VII.

STATE V. STATEN.

00°

THE OHIO RULE

The supreme court had read Colby and Keaton 01 it was clear
that confusion abounded and that some lower courts in Ohio were still
unsure of themselves when it came to applying a legal test for insanity.
Thus, in Staten the supreme court took it upon itself to lay down the
law again.
Like its ghostly predecessor, Clark v. State,2 °2 there are no facts in
the supreme court's Staten opinion to tell why Mr. Staten was sentenced to death for murder. It was simply stated that the trial court
judgment affirmed by the court of appeals was being heard by the su-

preme court on appeal because of defense counsel's sole contention that
the three-judge common pleas court had not used the proper test for
legal insanity. 0 8 The high court noted the record of the trial court
wherein the presiding judge said, "At this time, I will state that the
court feels that the McNaughten . . . rule is the law of Ohio. ' ' 204 Immediately following this, the supreme court wrote on its own, "[t]here
is nothing further in the record to indicate what test the trial court
used in determining that defendant should not be acquitted by reason
of insanity."205
The Staten court then proceeded to discuss the M'Naghten test
and what it considered to be the weak acceptance of it in Ohio. 2°6
Clark was then brought to the fore and it was stated that this rule was
the dominant persuasion in Ohio courts.2 7 There was an admission
that perhaps some Ohio tribunals in the distant past had lost their way
and strayed from the lighted path, but, on the whole, "decisions of this
court have made it clear that an accused will have no criminal respon-

4.01(1) (1962)). But see State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 188, 436 N.E.2d 523, 527 (1982)
(Staten test is "arguably less expansive" than Model Penal Code test). The Staten court criticised
the test employed in Keeton as "too favorable to the accused." Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 21 n.5,
47 N.E.2d at 299 n.5.
200. (Staten 1), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969), overruled in part as stated in
State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussed infra note 214).
201. See 18 Ohio St. 2d at 17 n.l, 47 N.E.2d at 296 n.1 (citing Colby's "failure to recognize [the free-will aspect) of the Ohio rule"); id. at 21 n.5, 47 N.E.2d at 299 n.5 (criticising
Keaton as giving an instruction "too favorable to the accused").
202. 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (in bank), overruled in part in Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146,
154-55, 45 N.E. 6, 8 (1896) and in part in State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317, 322, 73 N.E. 218,
219 (1904).
203. Staten 1, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 14, 247 N.E.2d at 295.
204. Id. (quoting trial judge's comments).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 15, 247 N.E.2d at 295 (citing State v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77,
appeal dismissed for want of debatable question, 158 Ohio St. 248, 108 N.E.2d 282 (1952); State
v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E.2d 510 (1942)).
207.byId.
at 15-16, 247
N.E.2d at 295-96.
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sibility for an act if he had no ability to refrain from doing that
act."

208

Thereupon, the court flew by Durham to a discussion justifying
the need for an insanity defense in the first place. To allay fears that
the insanity defense leads to the release of violent criminals back onto
the streets, appropriate sections of the Ohio Revised Code were summoned up to show that a successful not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity
plea does not result in freedom for the accused, but instead leads to a
period of confinement in Lima State Hospital with release conditioned
upon determination that sanity has been restored and that the released
defendant will not be dangerous. 09 "It is apparent therefore that Ohio
provides its public with adequate protection against those who are
found not guilty by reason of insanity."2 '
From this apparent attempt to speak to the fears of an anxietyridden public, the court launched into the purpose of Staten. "By its
[many] pronouncements," the court said, it had
concluded that a person should not be punished . .. if, by reason of
mental disease, he either does not know that what he did was wrong or
could not prevent himself from doing it; and that punishing such an irresponsible individual would deter neither him nor others from doing what
he did.
. ..To punish such an individual would be like inflicting punishment upon an inanimate object, such as a machine, because it had, without any intelligent human intervention, caused some damage."'
Unfortunately, a short paragraph followed discussing the concept
of diminished capacity. The court said that "such diminished capacity
may represent a reason for diminished punishment but not for an absence of any punishment."2 112 Furthermore, the court added, some punishment might very well have a deterrent effect on those who might be
inclined to "feign . . .diminished capacity. ' 21' The inclusion of this
topic in the opinion is unfortunate, for the court failed to explain why
feigning diminished capacity is not an attractive ploy for an accused,
who may, if successful in his attempt, thereby diminish the severity of
punishment. The opinion would not have suffered had this commentary
been omitted.
The court then concluded by clearly spelling out what the proper

208. Id. at 17, 247 N.E.2d at 296 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 18-19, 247 N.E.2d at 297-98 (citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2945.03, .39
(Anderson 1987)).
210. Id. at 19, 247 N.E.2d at 298.
211. Id. at 19-20, 247 N.E.2d at 298.
212. Id. at 20, 247 N.E.2d at 298.
213. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
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language to a jury would be when the defense of insanity is raised:
In order to establish the defense of insanity, the accused must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that disease or other defect of his
mind had so impaired his reason that, at the time of the criminal act
with which he is charged, either he did not know that such act was
wrong or he did not have the ability to refrain from doing that act.21 '

With this seminal pronouncement, the Ohio Supreme Court sent
the case back to the common pleas court with instructions to follow
either the new rule just laid down or paragraph four of Stewart, embodying the same essential features. Parenthetically, the trial court
reached the same result and the verdict was appealed again to the Ohio

Supreme Court.2

VIII.

5

This time, the court affirmed. 1
SUMMARY: STATEN RULES, CLARK LIVES

The Staten opinion was the death blow to M'Naghten in Ohio.?
Since its pronouncement in 1969, Staten has been cited and followed
almost uniformly."1 In only one case, State v. Humphries' " (1977),
has any of its holdings met with disapproval, and that case did not
concern the proper test for insanity, but rather the characterization in
Staten of the defendant's burden of proof, which the Humphries court
held had been superseded by later statutory enactment.2 °
Moreover, it would seem that the rule is well established in the

214. Id. at 21, 247 N.E.2d at 299 (footnotes omitted), overruled in part as stated in State
v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977). In Humphries, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that the requirement that defendant prove insanity by "a preponderance of the evidence" had been superseded by the General Assembly's enactment of section 2901.05 of the Ohio
Revised Code, which provided that all issues must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt-including the issue of sanity when defendant has met his burden of production by
raising a question as to his mental capacity. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 98-102, 364 N.E.2d at 1357-59
(citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.05 (Anderson 1987)).
215. State v. Staten (Staten If), 25 Ohio St. 2d 107, 267 N.E.2d 122 (1971), vacated per
curiam in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
216. Staten I1, 25 Ohio St. 2d at 110, 267 N.E.2d at 125. This was not the end of the
Staten case. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment "insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed." Staten v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 938 (1972)
(per curiam), vacating in part 25 Ohio St. 2d 107, 267 N.E.2d 122 (1971); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (death penalty held to "constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
217. See Staten 1 18 Ohio St. 2d at 15, 247 N.E.2d at 295 (by implication) (supreme court
has "generally" neither "mentioned the M'Naghten rule" nor been as conservative as the
M'Naghten court); see also supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St. 3d 123, 480 N.E.2d 414 (1985); State v.
Brown, 5 Ohio St. 3d 133, 449 N.E.2d 449 (1983); State v. Anders, 29 Ohio St. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d
554 (1972).
219. 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).
220. Id. at 98-102, 364 N.E.2d at 1357-59 (discussed supra note 214).
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lower courts. In State v. Coombs221 (1985), the Ohio Supreme Court
noted that
[a] close examination of the record before us reveals that the Staten
standard was the central subject of inquiry during the considerable portion of the trial proceedings which related to the insanity defense. That
standard was repeatedly referred to during questioning of the expert witnesses for both sides in an effort to establish whether or not defendant's
alleged mental disorder met the level required in Staten. The defendant's
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the
offenses, or to restrain himself from so acting, was the subject of substantial examination by both sides. The record contains page after page
of testimony on whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect,
whether he had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law, and
whether his alcohol consumption on the night in question was the true
cause of his alleged loss of self-control. The Staten test was accurately
and repeatedly articulated by counsel for both parties in their closing
arguments. Clearly, the trial as a whole was conducted with a view towards determining whether defendant's mental condition constituted legal insanity under Staten.2 "
Nothing lasts forever. Someday, after a long and arduous fight, no
doubt, the Staten test will be pushed aside in favor of one more "reasonable" and "descriptive." Perhaps by that time, all human behavior,
emotions, and thoughts will be discernible from examining a string of
DNA on the end of a pin. But until that time, Staten rules the State of
Ohio, and through Staten, the long-ago charge of Judge Birchard to
twelve true citizens sitting in the jury box in judgment of William
Clark can still be heard.

221.

18 Ohio St. 3d 123, 480 N.E.2d 414 (1985).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/4
222. Id. at 124-25, 480 N.E.2d at 416.

